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Abstract  
International sporting and mega-events such as London 2012 provide a pertinent 
case study through which to explore contemporary approaches to nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism. Using original focus group evidence from participants with 
expertise in the Olympics, this article provides an insight into how nationalist and 
cosmopolitan discourses emerge in dialogue between informed individuals set 
against an emotionally charged background. The evidence indicates that the 
transmission of emotions might be integral to the operation of nationalist but less so 
to cosmopolitan discourses, underscoring the conditional character of the latter 
discourses. Therefore, we suggest this takes previous work that associates 
nationalism with ‘hot’ emotions and cosmopolitanism with ‘cool’ emotions further. We 
found that most emotions appeared to be transmitted through challenges to, rather 
than in support of, a discourse. The opinions voiced in the focus groups are 
expected to be insightful for any investigation into the construction of nationalist and 
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cosmopolitan discourses or, indeed, broader research into how emotions are actually 
transmitted – all of which have obvious relevance for social scientists interested in 
nationalism, cosmopolitanism and the role of emotions. 
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Introduction 
The Olympic Games, and London 2012 in particular, offer a unique opportunity to 
empirically assess contemporary approaches to nationalism and cosmopolitanism 
(Giulianotti and Brownell, 2012). The Olympic Charter, the codification of the 
Olympic ideal, is couched in cosmopolitan language, calling for adherence to 
“universal fundamental ethical principles” and the “harmonious development of 
humankind” (IOC, 2011). The Charter also provides that the “Olympic Games are 
competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between 
countries” (IOC, 2011), yet, since the Stockholm Games of 1912, when athletes 
could no longer enter as individuals but had to be selected for a national team, there 
has been an explicit link between the Olympics and nationalism (Hargreaves, 1992). 
The intricate relationship between the Olympics, nationalism and cosmopolitanism 
was even more evident in the run-up to the Summer Olympics of 2012. From the 
outset, the London bid to host the 2012 Games aimed at strengthening British 
national identity (Jowell, 2006). At the same time, the bidding team promoted London 
as a cosmopolitan city within a nation that prides itself on its diversity and openness 
(Bulley and Lisle, 2012). As such, London 2012 offered an appropriate context for 
nationalist and cosmopolitan discourses.  
 
Drawing on Emile Durkheim (1995) and more recent scholarship on the affective turn 
(Nussbaum, 2001; Barbalet, 2002; Ahmed, 2004; Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008; 
Wetherell, 2012), this article attaches importance to the transmission of emotions in 
the construction of these discourses.i We use the term ‘transmission of emotions’ 
instead of the widely used term ‘sharing of emotions’ (Smith et al., 2007; Salmela, 
2012, 2014) to indicate that we treat emotional experience not only as an internal 
 4 
state of mind that people come to share with each other, that is, an aggregate of 
already existing feelings, but also as a social activity in the course of which these 
feelings are intensified, attenuated or transformed. As Sullivan (2014a, p. 3) notes, 
“sharing appears to be a metaphor for the degree of similarity of appraisals and felt 
group-level emotions experienced and expressed by others, rather than indicating 
how these emotions are expressed congruently in interactions, rituals, or affective 
practices.” In contrast, the metaphor of transmission allows us to explore those 
interactive settings where emotionally driven discourses are prone to emerge, 
manifest and disseminate.ii  
 
The authors conducted focus group research with government employees, media 
practitioners and international academics – all with an interest in the Olympics – on 
25th July 2012, the first day of the 2012 Games, at a venue in London. By analysing 
the discursive interactions and guided conversations of this select group, this article 
seeks to answer the question of how nationalist and cosmopolitan discourses 
operate through the transmission of emotions. Overall, the focus group evidence 
indicates that the transmission of emotions is likely to be integral to the operation of 
nationalist but less so to cosmopolitan discourses. In both cases however, the 
transmission of emotions was most apparent when participants expressed opposition 
to certain aspects of the Games – be it Olympic symbols, media reports, the notion 
of contest and so on.  
 
The article is structured as follows. The first section provides a sketch of 
contemporary theories of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The second section 
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considers the role of emotions in the construction of nationalist and cosmopolitan 
discourses. The third section provides some insight into the background of the focus 
group participants and outlines the methods adopted for this research. The fourth 
section presents an analysis of original focus group discussions on London 2012. 
The fifth and final section concludes by suggesting that the transmission of emotions 
is more integral to the operation of nationalist than cosmopolitan discourses. It 
indicates that emotions are often transmitted through challenges to, rather than in 
support of, a discourse.  
 
Nationalism and cosmopolitanism in contemporary political thought  
In order to provide a framework for analysing the empirical evidence, this section 
briefly considers theoretical approaches to nationalism and then to cosmopolitanism. 
We recognise the importance of 20th century literature on nationalism in elucidating 
the political, economic and cultural factors integral to nationalism, particularly that 
written by authors such as Ernest Gellner (1983), Anthony Smith (1987) and Eric 
Hobsbawm (1990). However, for the purposes of this article these scholars 
(particularly Gellner and Hobsbawm) do not adequately consider the imaginations 
and perceptions of people – factors that are integral to our approach that prioritises 
discursive constructions. This may be indicative of their focus on modern and pre-
modern eras but our article, with its original focus group evidence from 2012, is not 
dismissive of discursive constructions and focuses on the period of postmodernity. 
Accordingly, we draw more from the work of Benedict Anderson (1983), Michael 
Billig (1995), Ruth Wodak et al. (2009) and Sabina Mihelj (2011, p. 15) who 
emphasise the importance of communicative practices in shaping people’s ways of 
thinking about nationalism.  
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Anderson (1983) considers nationalism to be a cultural artifact. He defines national 
communities as inherently limited due to their finite boundaries or territories, but at 
the same time “imagined”. These communities are imagined because “the members 
of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion” (Anderson, 1983, p. 6). Treating nations as imagined communities 
allows issues of nationalism and community to be conceived of as mental constructs 
and has thus been utilised widely by constructivists and those undertaking discursive 
analyses (Billig, 1995; Wodak et al., 2009; Mihelj, 2011). Following such 
observations, nationalism can be expected to promote certain features. Specifically 
these are: (i) intra-national uniformity; (ii) inter-national heterogeneity; (iii) references 
to a common national past, present and future; and, (iv) a national identity 
fundamentally constructed in opposition to the perception of the Other (Wodak et al., 
2009). Therefore, a discourse promoting nationalism is expected to include a focus 
on a unified national community (in the past, present and future), heightened by 
emphasis on the difference of the Other.  
 
While nationalism focuses on limited imagined communities, cosmopolitanism treats 
the individual rather than the nation – or, in fact, any other unit of social aggregation 
– as the ultimate unit of moral concern (Nussbaum, 1997; Held, 2003; Cabrera, 
2010). During Roman times, classical cosmopolitanism developed through Stoic 
thinkers such as Marcus Cicero who stressed the importance of human rationality, 
human fraternity and a natural universal law (Brown and Held, 2010, p. 5). Today, 
normative aspects persist in elements of 21st century cosmopolitanism, but steps 
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have been undertaken to come to a more conciliatory understanding of both 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Dissatisfied with its exclusive character, some 
writers on nationalism have advocated the promotion of liberal values (Tamir, 1993), 
and writers on cosmopolitanism have explored ways of making space for moderate 
forms of nationalism (Calhoun, 2002). In what has been termed the ‘post-
universalism’ of the ‘new cosmopolitanism’ of the post-Cold War era, a ‘both-and’ 
rather than an ‘either-or’ outlook has been observed (Beck, 2006; Fine, 2007; 
Delanty, 2009). What particularly concerns Beck (2006) is what he views as the 
myopic tendencies towards a ‘methodological nationalism’. According to Beck, 
methodological nationalism involves social scientific analysis that focuses 
predominantly on national frames, instead of considering the various levels of the 
social that can include, but is not limited to, the national.  
 
In terms of cosmopolitanism, this article, like Beck, is interested in approaches that 
have proposed forms that clearly allow for recognition of a range of collectives, in 
addition to those constituted by the nation. Ulf Hannerz (1996) has argued that 
cosmopolitanism is about embracing diversity, where the self engages with different 
Others. For John Tomlinson (1999), writing in 1999, ‘connectivity’ was integral to 
cultural globalisation and engagement with the Other on a global level. Our case 
study is set in 2012 where new modes of communication have further increased the 
potential for various forms of connectivity – whether through news, social or other 
forms of communications media. This demands a more flexible approach to 
assessing engagement and the construction of community. Therefore we refer to 
Gerard Delanty’s (2009, pp. 85-86) broader criteria for a new ‘cosmopolitan 
imagination’, comprising of: (i) self-reflexivity; (ii) a positive recognition of the Other; 
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(iii) a capacity for a mutual evaluation of communities through inter-cultural dialogue; 
and, (iv) the possibility of one normative global culture. This approach to 
cosmopolitanism allows for the consideration of multiple ways in which people can 
engage and connect with each other in the 21st century.   
 
In summary, Table 1 highlights distinctions that can be made between the two 
discourses considered in this article. As stated above, the form of nationalism 
searched for in our data will be that which is encouraged by discussion that supports 
the national community and can be enhanced through emotions. Following a more 
cultural form of cosmopolitanism, a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ approach aims for 
engagement between self and Other on an individual or collective basis and its 
affective disposition is geared towards this.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The transmission of emotions  
This article adds to the aforementioned approaches on nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism by considering the transmission of emotions in the operation of 
nationalist and cosmopolitan discourses. In his writings on nationalism, Gellner 
(1971, p. 149) suggested that any clash between liberalism and nationalism could be 
likened to a “tug of war between reason and passion”.iii However, the notion of a 
strict demarcation and opposition between rationality and emotions has been 
challenged by a number of scholars (Nussbaum, 2001; Barbalet, 2002; Bleiker and 
Hutchison, 2008, von Scheve, 2012). Agreeing with Jack Barbelet (2002) that all 
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actions, even the act of reasoning, require appropriate emotions to facilitate their 
achievement, we therefore draw on Kate Nash (2003) who describes how the 
cosmopolitan ideal has been considered a ‘cool’, stoical emotion that promotes 
liberal rationality, whereas identification with a national community has been 
associated with ‘hot’ emotions such as anger and hatred.iv But even this dichotomy 
can be criticised for its tendency to idealise the former and reify the latter (Nash, 
2003, p. 507). We therefore shy away from the absolute terms of ‘cool’ and ‘hot’ 
emotions, and suggest that by looking to the transmission of emotions – rather than 
the emotions themselves – one can differentiate between ‘cooler’, less transmitted 
and ‘hotter’, more transmitted emotions. What distinguishes the former from the 
latter, then, is: (i) a greater detachment, allowing for more reflective ways of thinking; 
and, (ii) a greater diffusion, preventing these emotions from building up.  
 
In our attempt to identify emotions, we follow a number of scholars who have 
investigated the transmission and transferal of emotions (Ahmed, 2004; Closs 
Stephens, 2014) and studied the relational patterns that emerge (Wetherell, 2012; 
Jones et al., 2014). In her work on emotions, Sara Ahmed (2004, p. 4) does not 
consider emotions to be ‘in’ any individual or ‘in’ any society, nor does she study 
emotions per se, but what emotions do. More specifically, Ahmed is interested in the 
impact of emotions and considers how emotions and consequently power structures 
circulate, accumulate and become intractable and enduring (Ahmed, 2004, pp.10-
12). For example, the words ‘paki’ or ‘nigger’ have been repeated sufficiently over 
time to build a sticky meaning that allows them to contribute to ‘hate speech’ and this 
can stimulate affects in bodies (Ahmed, 2004, pp. 59-60). There is scope to employ 
Ahmed’s approach in other cases and Suzanne Hall (2014) applies Ahmed’s 
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conception of emotionality effectively in her work on the emotional development of 
stigmatisation of urban estates and subsequent calls for their regeneration. In turn, in 
her research on nationalism, Angharad Closs Stephens (2014, p. 62) outlines how 
her objective is to enable “us to talk about the tonalities and intensities of nationality” 
as it flows and passes between bodies. If the idea that emotions are contained by 
individuals or collectives is rejected, investigations surrounding the ebbs and flows of 
emotions are clearly an appropriate method to understand better affective 
dispositions. This article’s use of focus group interactions on the Olympics provides 
an opportunity for our own unique analysis of the social dynamics referred to by 
these scholars. We will be looking at statements made between individuals to help 
assess how emotions transmitted within the groups. 
 
In addition to Ahmed (2004), who notes how emotions can ‘stick’ to bodies over time, 
we draw on both Durkheim and Hargreaves, who each stress the importance of 
rituals and symbols in this regard. For Durkheim (in Shilling 2002, p. 18), “collective 
effervescence” – a phrase he coined to describe the energy that emerges when 
people gather collectively – can change individuals’ emotional experience as it 
spreads “a sort of electricity” that is generated in the interaction between people. He 
argued that through social gatherings, and, particularly, rituals that create something 
“sacred”, “individuals imagine the society of which they are members and the 
obscure and yet intimate relations they have with it” (Durkheim, 1995, p. 227). 
Although Durkheim, writing in 1912, was concerned with religion and its use of 
rituals, his findings informed John Hargreaves authoritative study of the 1992 
Barcelona Olympics. According to Hargreaves (2000, p. 15, p. 56), a Durkheimian 
assessment of sports appreciates the powerful impact that ritual symbols – symbols 
 11 
that accrue meaning through their part in rituals – can have on emotions related to 
national or global cultures associated with the Games. v Hargreaves argues that 
these symbols can covertly convey a very large number of references to nationalism 
or internationalism. Since our focus groups took place at the beginning of the Games 
when Olympic paraphernalia and symbols were widespread and some of these 
symbols (including Olympic post cards and pictures of London 2012 mascots) were 
even given to the participants as prompts, the evidence should be particularly well 
suited to shed light on this issue.  
 
In summary, we can outline a number of factors that we shall be ‘searching for’ in the 
focus group evidence. Firstly, in order to assess the transmission of emotions we 
follow Ahmed (2004) and those who have applied her conception of emotionality 
(see Hall, 2014). We therefore consider (i) circulation, (ii) accumulation and (iii) 
endurance – but we have added our own specific empirical indicators that we could 
expect to find in the predominantly linguistic discursive data derived from our focus 
groups. With regard to (i) circulation, we look for repetition and imitation of emotions, 
for (ii) accumulation, we focus on the building and development of emotions and, for 
(iii) the endurance of emotions, we consider the overcoming of challenges over time. 
Secondly, we have added a breakdown of the phenomena to which emotions might 
‘stick’ to for our particular study on Olympics discourse. Influenced by Ahmed (2004), 
Durkheim (1995) and Hargreaves (2000) we have chosen to look for examples of 
emotions ‘sticking’ to (i) bodies, (ii) rituals and (iii) symbols. Accordingly, we shall 
look for examples of national and cosmopolitan emotions pertaining to (i) people 
(e.g. human achievement), (ii) practices (e.g. ceremonies) and (iii) objects (e.g. 
flags). Table 2 summarises these points.  
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Table 2 about here 
 
Research methods  
To explore these processes, we draw on three focus group discussions with 
government employees, media practitioners and international academics. The focus 
groups were moderated by the authors at an international conference, entitled 
‘Olympics and the ‘Isms’’, that took place in London on 25th July 2012, the first day of 
the 2012 Games. These discussions were conducted in order to draw attention to 
the Olympic discourses participants had been exposed to, including those in 
mainstream and social media.  
 
The reasons for selecting focus groups are two-fold. First, focus groups are 
particularly well-suited for carrying out exploratory research in a sensitive field of 
study (Morgan, 1998, p. 11). We were interested in finding out emotive aspects of 
the Games – be they sports related or otherwise – that would not, normally, be the 
subject of everyday discussions. We also recognise the difficulty associated with 
distinguishing between different discourses related to grand ideologies such as 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Notwithstanding these issues, we propose that the 
interaction among participants can elucidate the shape of such discourses and what 
their dominant and marginal characteristics are likely to be. The recent turn in social 
sciences towards emotions (Ahmed, 2004; Stephens, 2014) has also created a new 
challenge for researchers, namely to explore how emotions diffuse in practice. Unlike 
interviews or surveys, focus groups include diverse views and different emotional 
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processes and they can be illustrative of how discourses manifest through the 
transmission of emotions (Flick, 2014). Second, the interaction, reasoning and forms 
of reflection present in the focus groups allow for a more in-depth analysis of the 
research topic (Morgan, 1998) and can elucidate how participants collectively make 
sense of the topic (Bryman, 2012, pp. 503-504). Since participants can go beyond a 
set of interview questions and probe one another for holding certain perspectives, 
the resulting interactions also emphasise the topics they consider most important. 
From these topics, this article notes the attention participants paid to cosmopolitan 
and nationalist themes. Since our primary objective is to shed light on the 
transmission of emotions, issues related to generalisability are expected to be 
outweighed by the original insight provided by the focus group evidence, especially 
the interaction between our participants and the dynamics within and across the 
three groups.  
 
All together, the focus groups included 19 participants, seven females and twelve 
males.vi The majority of participants had British (8) or American nationality (4), and 
the others came from a number of countries, including Brazil, Canada, China, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary and Iraq. Due to their academic, professional and 
governmental involvement in the Olympics, participants’ expertise in social, political 
and ideological issues surrounding the Games was expected to grant a somewhat 
elitist character to the discussions. There is already evidence to suggest that elite 
positions are often coupled with a (projected) preference for cosmopolitan 
discourses (Skey, 2011). Hence we assumed that the focus group context would 
provide ample opportunity for the transmission of emotions linked to cosmopolitan 
discourses. Peer-pressure – an inherent feature of focus groups – from fellow 
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participants and the authors – in their formal roles as conference co-organisers and 
moderators – were anticipated to further participants’ preference for cosmopolitan 
discourses. These assumptions informed our original preparations for the focus 
groups. They were planned to last for about 45 minutes to an hour and were divided 
into three main parts. First, moderators asked participants open questions about 
which significant discourses they had come across in relation to the Games and then 
London 2012. After about 15 minutes, participants were asked about nationalist and 
cosmopolitan discourses in relation to London 2012, with moderators playing a 
minimal role. The last ten minutes were spent on discussing what the legacy of 
London 2012 might look like compared to previous Games. The resulting debates 
contradicted some of our assumptions; they drew attention to the integral role the 
transmission of emotions has in the operation of nationalist discourses, and to the 
fact that most emotions were transmitted through challenges to (rather than in 
support of) a discourse.vii  
 
Empirical observations and discussion 
Having discussed the research methods we adopted to undertake this research, the 
next two parts of this article present a thematic analysis of our focus group evidence, 
exploring how nationalist and cosmopolitan discourses (as summarised in Table 1) 
operate through the transmission of emotions (as summarised in Table 2).  
 
Nationalist discourses  
Every group recognised that some high profile London 2012 discourses had an 
almost exclusive focus on the city of London, challenging the promotion of nationalist 
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discourses through the Olympics. Depending on their country of origin however, 
participants evaluated differently the impact of these discourses. This disparity then 
created an interesting dynamism in each group, depending on the distribution of 
British and international participants. British participants seemed to be quite 
expressive when the focus groups discussed whether or not nationalist discourses 
were relevant to London 2012. Their original perceptions of the UK as a “small 
nation” and Team GB as a “dream” were developed into the “dream we’ve had as a 
nation”. They then became more and more critical of the almost singular attention of 
the mainstream media on the city of London and did not find it appropriate that this 
event turned into “London's spotlight … instead of the UK’s spotlight”. They 
suggested that London 2012 should have been “very much about supporting Team 
GB”, because it was made up of athletes who came from all over the country. 
Apparently affected by contagion, participants with personal ties to regions outside of 
London also picked up on this line of argument. They anticipated that their friends 
and family were “out of touch” from the 2012 event and were likely to “turn [the TV] 
off” because of its emphasis on “world to London and London to world”.  
 
A couple of foreign participants also built on the scepticism British participants 
expressed and recognised that London 2012 discourses in their home country 
usually neglected how regions outside of London contributed to the Olympic event. 
Nonetheless, they did not criticise this approach. Instead, they presumed references 
to London were about the UK as well. British participants reacted to this claim with 
some resentment; either by stopping the conversation so that the moderator had to 
take charge of the discussion – as in the example below – or by ignoring these 
comments in their entirety and turning to debate other issues – as in Groups 2 and 3.  
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British Male (1), Group 1:viii [There is] this tagline of bringing London to the 
world and the world to London, but I was almost flinching from the word 
London. I was thinking of my friends up North, they would have turned it 
off a long time ago. 
British Male (2): There seems to [be] these two narratives. They let the 
Games be a national theme, like the Olympic torch was a national survey 
through all of the towns in the UK. Yet, all the things today, all the things 
[are] about London. And there is a real, I mean, I spent the last days of 
the week in my home in South Derbyshire, which is in the Midlands… 
They didn't even care about things [related to the Games]! It seems to be 
a London thing and it was so London centric when, really, the Games 
should be more, for a small nation like Britain, more inclusive. … 
American Female: Yes, I was actually thinking about that because, as the 
token foreigner in this group, we don't notice that. We hear London and 
we think of the UK. Or, I might say England. While I know there is a 
difference between Wales, England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. [But] 
like when I'm talking about it back home, I would never make that 
distinction, unless I was talking to someone from the UK. For us, when we 
hear London or when people are talking to us about London, like, it’s the 
UK. And for us it is comparable [to the country on the whole]… [Silence.] 
 
Here the American participant recognised her tendency to ignore intra-national 
British differences in the context of the Olympics. According to Wodak et al.’s 
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(2009) criterion for the promotion of national identity, such a trait could assist in 
the development of national identity through discursive constructions of intra-
national homogeneity. However, the American participant was challenging British 
participants with her suggestion that Britain could be represented globally via the 
capital, London. The impassioned support of British participants for a more 
inclusive British approach incorporating other cities and regions also called for an 
intra-national uniformity, but to an inclusive end, rather than an exclusionary one. 
Thus, while all participants promoted intra-national unity, the final silence hints 
that a challenge to inclusive intra-national unity had been rejected and ‘endured’ 
by British participants. 
 
In the later stages of the focus groups, most participants, mainly younger ones, 
suggested social media sites such as Twitter and Facebook as the source of 
“counter-culture” and “counter-narrative”, emphasising the nationalist discourse 
of the Games and individual pride to the public across the UK. Interestingly, the 
use of the word ‘individual’, traditionally associated with cosmopolitanism, also 
suggested that positive dispositions towards nationalism did not preclude a 
focus on individuals. 
British Male, Group 2: Media 2012 … is based around local reporters all 
over the country using Twitter … building the stories from individual 
representatives and turned it into this more… nationalised phenomenon 
rather than just the Olympics.  
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American Female, Group 3: [H]ashtag London 2012 here’s lots of 
individual pride too, [like] [Reads out quote from Twitter] ‘One in seven 
Great Britain athletes competing in London, born in Sheffield, live in 
Sheffield, train in Sheffield.’ So [it is] not just on the whole [about the UK], 
but bringing out all the little towns and recognising [their input].    
 
Indeed, social media websites, including those facilitated by the Counter Olympics 
Network and Media 2012 criticised mainstream outlets for their failure to recognise 
the impact of London 2012 on the entirety of the British national community (Pope, 
2014). The nationalist discourse of London 2012 has also been found to be relevant 
internationally. For example, in China, social media activism during London 2012 
underscored a ‘transcendental Chinese patriotism’. This patriotism was linked to 
individualism, transnationalism and universalism, rather than more traditional ideals 
linked to state authority, Confucian tradition or history (Du, 2014). Similarly, our 
participants claimed that the more traditional British nationalist discourses were, 
originally, marginally presenter at the Games. They then interpreted the rebranding 
of the Olympic Park to Queen Elizabeth Park  as an attempt to ‘make up’ for the 
more pronounced London focus of the Games. “It was obviously trying to appeal to 
‘What do people understand about Britain?’ Well, it’s got a Queen!’ I’ve never heard 
it being called that [Queen Elizabeth Park] before! And lots of attention grabbing 
logos, lots of Union Jack posters and that kind of thing [has been put up]” (British-
Chinese Female, Group 3).  
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There was a slight difference between how Groups 1 and 2, where British 
participants were in the majority, and Group 3, where only 2 out of 7 participants 
were British, perceived London 2012. Similarly to Groups 1 and 2, most participants 
seemed, at first, critical about the city-focus of the mainstream media in Group 3. 
However, contrary to the previous examples, a Canadian participant expected that 
on an individual level, “being able to attend [the 2012] events”, brought it “home” to 
the local people and united the British nation. Subsequently, the Canadian and 
Hungarian participants highlighted the accessibility of the London event, while British 
participants spoke of its exclusivity, referring to “VIP lanes” and expensive tickets. 
The exchange in Group 3 thus underlined the likely impact of factors such as 
nationality (host or other) and the experience of attending or being linked to the 
Games were likely to have.  
British Male, Group 3: Yes, [it is] a quite an interesting one actually, 
specifically for the question, ‘Does the London venue detract from the 
Olympics as a nation-building exercise?’ Coming back to this promotion of 
the city, are these other places [where athletes come from] excluded by 
the mainstream stuff?    
Hungarian Female: And it touches on your [conference] paper, which [is 
where] I read about Manchester trying to get the Olympic bid. They 
actually helped London to be successful! ... It’s interesting to see that. 
However, the current media doesn’t seem to talk about any other city 
[apart from London].  
American Female: It’s interesting that this individual city leaps out of the 
paper here [in The Times article which was previously given as prompt to 
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the group] and makes itself known, because, that’s true, all these other 
cities tend to be forgotten ...    
Canadian Female: I think, on an individual level, not necessarily the 
promotion of it, just, in terms of being able to attend events it has been 
very open to local people. In Vancouver it wasn’t [open]. It was very-very 
difficult, nearly impossible to get tickets! There was a draw and you put 
your name into the draw and you could get tickets and that was early on 
and the rest were sold off at insane prices! Whereas here, I know so many 
people who are going to the events and I think that really brings it home. 
[It] brings it more to the local people and I know a lot of people from 
around England, specifically who are coming to London. So, in that way, I 
think it is kind of uniting the nation. 
British Female: I have got the opposite [impression] of that. No one I know 
has tickets, except me. And I’ve been talking to people who live pretty 
much on the boundary [of the Olympic city] … they don’t have tickets 
[either] and are completely dissociated with [the events]. 
 
The ‘accessibility’ of London 2012 was thus expected to have different 
consequences for how the British nationalist discourse manifested. Participants – a 
group of experts with access to different Olympic events – may have perceived 
London 2012 ‘more accessible’ than previous events. However, they expected the 
inherently exclusivist character of any Olympics event to be a source of detachment 
among the public.   
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Nationalist discourses were also considered in relation to the Olympic torch relay 
(rituals) and the performance of national athletes (bodies). However, the torch relay 
was only mentioned once and this was in opposition to the increasingly mainstream 
focus on London – to challenge mainstream approaches to London 2012. In 
comparison, a couple of references were made to the individual achievements of 
athletes, which seemed to have led to a sense of excitement among our participants, 
highlighting patriotic feelings and national prowess.  
American Female, Group 2: I think since 1996 – that was the Olympics 
that I got to see [in person] – and I just remember the patriotism that I did 
feel. It was Kerri Strug went up and [what] she did, I don’t know. But I 
remember because she was American [and] she scored [high on] the 
gymnastics [leading to team] victory. And I’m not even a patriot, but I was 
just absolutely, oh that feeling will never go away! And that was very 
connected to patriotism and I guess, personal identity – just having been 
there, being American, being, you know, a young girl and watching this 
gymnastics team. So that was a very personal thing and narrative that will 
never go away. 
 
Shortly after, in the same group, British participants separately referred to British 
Olympians from past and present including Jessica Ennis and the ski jumper ‘Eddie 
the Eagle’. These names appeared to have further accumulated the sense of 
enthusiasm among them, especially in their consideration of compatriots’ 
participation in the Games. Actually, their resulting sense of enthusiasm seemed to 
be the only one to endure subsequent challenges when the discussions turned to 
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negative or critical topics linked to the Olympic Games, including issues related to 
ticket prices and security. 
 
Therefore, the focus group evidence illustrates well the fruitfulness of considering 
how nationalist discourses emerged in relation to the ‘imagined community’ 
(Anderson, 1983) of the host country of the Games. Following Wodak et al.’s (2009) 
criteria for the construction of national identity, there was evidence of a desire for 
some forms of intra-national homogeneity and allegiance. According to the evidence, 
these discourses were mainly stimulated by the transmission of emotions and the 
sporting achievement of athletes at both past and imminent Olympics competitions, 
thereby meeting another of Wodak et al.’s criteria. However, there was less 
discourse referring to foreign nations’ otherness or difference. Furthermore, the 
evidence indicates that symbols and rituals were less important to promoting the 
nationalist discourse. Indeed, participants discussed these issues in relation to the 
cosmopolitan discourse of the Games. The next part of the article explores the 
cosmopolitan discourse in more detail. 
 
Cosmopolitan discourses  
It was more difficult to identify when participants talked about cosmopolitan (rather 
than nationalist) discourses. These discourses were brought up incidentally and, 
mostly, in opposition to other discourses, such as the ‘positive sporting vibe’ that can 
prevail during the Games. Each focus group recognised that the cosmopolitan 
discourse was “very strongly” embodied in official International Olympic Committee 
and mainstream media discourses on the Olympics and London 2012., However, 
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they criticised the failure of the organisers to produce a sense of genuine 
cosmopolitanism during the Games. On the few occasions where compliments were 
made to the Games, the tone of discussions was noticeably more enthusiastic. This 
was apparent, for example, when participants spoke of the successful link between 
cosmopolitanism and the Games: “I don't want to be cynical [because] it’s just, 
everything is so much fun! It’s so cultural!” (American Female, Group 2). The 
following dialogues and exchanges illustrate well the general sense of excitement 
with which these groups were “looking at the bigger picture” during London 2012. 
 
Hungarian Female, Group 3: [T]he Olympics is supposed to be about a 
global, everyone getting together! When I look at the symbol, it’s all about 
bringing five different continents together. It’s not about the different 
nations coming together. It’s looking at the bigger picture already. 
American Female: I think that it does promote this kind of global unity and 
bringing people together in that it gives people a window to the world that 
they might not otherwise have. Someone in the States may not ever have 
[the opportunity] to travel overseas and see London or see Beijing or see 
Rio. So I think that, by being able to see the Olympics and being able to 
partake, [it] really increases your global perspective and, I think, makes 
you feel a bit more united, because it just raises your awareness. So I 
think in that regard, it does kind of achieve that goal of global unity and 
bringing people together and making it about something larger. 
 
There was thus a strong sense among the groups that a cosmopolitan outlook 
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towards the rest of the world was desired (Skey, 2011, 2014), and could be 
promoted as part of the Olympic discourse. 
 
The above exchange was, however, the only one in which positive emotional 
repetition, imitation and further development of participants’ ideas about a global 
community sustained the cosmopolitan discourse of London 2012. As the 
discussions progressed, participants became more and more critical about whether 
Olympic and, more specifically, London 2012 discourses promoted cosmopolitan 
discourses. Although the majority asserted that these discourses were generally 
important for the Olympics, quite a few claimed that producing this type of “elevating 
conversation” was only possible when the event went well, “because there’s less to 
get distracted by” and “you can talk it out with great story lines”. In this context, the 
tendency to emphasise the positive aspects of the Games was perceived as a 
concern, “because there’s not really an avenue or a venue to talk about the negative” 
impacts. Contrary to its original objective then, framing the Games in a “positive” 
light, seemed to challenge the cosmopolitan discourse, simply because it “hijacked” 
other perspectives. Against this backdrop, our participants expressed a growing 
sense of cynicism about the endurance of the cosmopolitan discourse through the 
Olympics. For example, in a sharp contrast to her discussions of a “global unity” – 
cited above –, the American participant in Group 3 also wanted to talk about the 
“unfortunate stories” of the Games. 
American Female, Group 3: I think that’s what our research is focused on, 
[Olympic discourses are] always too positive and there is a lot to celebrate 
and it can be a good thing. But there are some unfortunate stories, but 
obviously [these stories] don’t get the spotlight. You want people 
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overcoming obstacles to compete in the Olympics and get these medals, 
but then [on] the other side, there are people in communities in East 
London that may be displaced or their jobs are affected. So there’s 
absolutely a lack of a story of the negative economic effects versus 
always the positive effects. Everyone’s always talking about how it’s going 
to be so great … but there’s also a real cost in terms of the effect on the 
people and the environment, which isn’t talked about. 
British-Chinese Female: Yes, and I think that the general idea that you get 
from the media is that if you, in any way, emphasise those alternative 
narratives about the underlying reality of the Olympics, you’re considered 
to be unpatriotic or you’re just some miserable communist.  
 
Even when participants accepted that Olympic and cosmopolitan discourses had an 
underlying association, they identified further challenges to the extent to which this 
association was likely to materialise. Firstly, most participants assumed that 
promoting cosmopolitan discourses through Olympic discourses was “a new thing”. 
Two out of three groups had a debate about previous Olympic events, which took 
place during the Cold War and where cosmopolitan discourses were subordinated to 
world politics. “[I]f you think back to Moscow in [19]80 and the politicisation of the 
Olympics, that completely ruined competition” (British Male, Group 2). These 
comments appeared to underline the novelty of the link between Olympic 
competition and cosmopolitanism, rather than their deep-rootedness. Secondly, all 
groups debated whether the focus of London 2012 was really on the cosmopolitan 
discourse. Participants suggested that, instead, commercialism was in the limelight 
at this event. Accordingly, they spoke of IOC rules limiting the reproduction of the 
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Olympic brand and “the [Olympic] branding police”, which had to guarantee that 
there is an “official hologram” on all authorised products, from mascots to tickets and 
post cards, thereby restricting the potential for cosmopolitan symbols such as the 
Olympic Rings to be circulated and shared. ix  In this context, the cosmopolitan 
discourse was often seen as supporting the attempts of official partners to realise 
commercial success. 
American Female, Group 1: I think companies are trying to kind of seize 
the opportunity of the Olympics, I think they tend to choose … the kind of 
global human story that kind of makes you feel happy about being a 
citizen of the world and [be] inspired … [since] the greatest people from all 
across the world [come here to] do the best of whatever sport.  
 
Hence the transmission of emotions had a primarily challenging tone when it came to 
the cosmopolitan discourse of London 2012. This finding seems to match well the 
emerging literature on cosmopolitanism as a “fragile” discourse that is unlikely to 
weaken the strength of the nationalist discourse (Skey, 2011). It also corresponds 
with the literature on the link between contemporary sporting events and 
cosmopolitanism, and the overly positive framing of London 2012 more specifically 
(Bulley and Lisle, 2012; Skey, 2014). Actually, the majority of the later literature 
identified security concerns (Graham, 2012) and commercialism (Girginov, 2013) as 
prominent discourses at this event, challenging its cosmopolitan legacy. The 
supposed novelty of the cosmopolitan discourse of the Games might also account 
for its limitation – more recently epitomised in the lead-up to the 2014 Winter Games 
in Sochi. In this case, the IOC (2013) did not embrace broader debates about 
Russia’s human rights laws but set up a specific protest zone for demonstrators – 
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isolating debates about human rights from the actual sporting events in order to 
guarantee commercial success. Since similar issues can be expected to emerge in 
the upcoming events in both Rio (2016) and Pyeongchang (2018), the 
cosmopolitanism is likely to remain a challenging aspect of (official) Olympic 
discourses.  
 
Contrary to the sceptical tone of these developments however, our participants 
categorised Olympic symbols, including the Olympic rings, as fruitful to promoting 
the cosmopolitan discourse. One group lamented the lack of traditional symbols at 
London 2012 but another’s exchange (outlined in a previous quote) concerning 
‘bringing five different continents together’ and ‘global unity’ best illustrated this point.   
Nonetheless, across all groups the most cited symbol of 2012 was the city of 
London. Observed as an “international city” or “global city” in which “the different 
cultural backgrounds … came across very strongly” (British Male, Group 1), the 
Olympics appeared to have made “London look like the best city in the world”. Of 
course, the excited tone of discussions about London as “the best city in the world” 
was far removed from the previous criticisms about how it diverted attention from 
British national community. Indeed, the celebration of diversity and British history 
and culture in the opening ceremony presented the city of London as a symbol of a 
cosmopolitan nation. However, a review of the ceremony’s reception amongst 
international press (Pope, 2014) found cosmopolitan aspects that had been 
championed in UK news media to be reported very little elsewhere. Hence, 
enthusiasm surrounding this example of cosmopolitanism – the cosmopolitan symbol 
of London – was not repeated and did not ‘circulate’. 
 
 28 
Furthermore, when attached to bodies, Groups 2 and 3 spoke of the transformative 
potential of cosmopolitan discourses, considering previous perceptions of the 
Paralympics as the ‘Other’ to the Games. Thus “Meet the Superhumans” in Channel 
4’s headline for the Paralympics was identified as “one of the most remarkable 
pieces” of London 2012 and Olympics discourses, and was detected to have turned 
“pretty much every stereotype on its head”.  
British Male, Group 2: And the whole line "Meet the Superhumans" shows 
these athletes performing amazing things and could really change peoples' 
perceptions! [It presents] a whole opportunity to rebrand things: whether 
through the Paralympics attitudes to disability, whether it be cities, culture [and] 
our relations with the world at large. 
 
This enthusiastic approval for radically enhancing engagement with an ‘Other’ seems 
to accord with one of Delanty’s (2009, p.86) criteria for cosmopolitanism, advocating 
positive recognition of the ‘Other’. The success of the Paralympics could contribute 
to British national pride too, but it certainly does not preclude a cosmopolitan 
approach according to Delanty’s criteria. Similarly, where Delanty suggested 
cosmopolitanism displayed universal normative values, focus groups touched on the 
“global family of the Olympics”, which supported human achievement (bodies), 
regardless of the origins of the athletes. Participants claimed that during the 
Olympics “people are much more open to following the prowess of any athlete, 
regardless of which country they come from … [Thus] someone in England would 
cheer on Usain Bolt. So something really extraordinary happens, as people want to 
become part of the global family of the Olympics” (British Male, Group 2). These 
examples indicate the transformative potential of London 2012 discourses, which 
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may have revised previous perceptions of the (Olympic and national) Other. 
Previously, national pride may have limited such enthusiasm for the prowess of 
foreign nationals, but here admiration for human athletic achievement was clearly 
evident. Nonetheless, it is important to note that discussions related to the symbols 
and bodies of cosmopolitan discourses were diffuse within and across the focus 
groups. For example, there was no rhythmic discussion of these issues in Group 3 
and Group 1 did not discuss the excitement associated with supporting athletes in 
order to promote human achievement or become part of the “Olympic family”. 
Hence, in the case of London 2012, the actual significance of symbols and bodies to 
which cosmopolitan discourses were attached are likely to have been limited, 
especially compared to the ‘transmission of emotions’ which appeared to have 
challenged these discourses.  
 
Therefore, the focus group evidence suggests that the transmission of emotions was 
mainly used when our participants challenged the cosmopolitan discourse in relation 
to London 2012. This finding may seem predictable, especially if we accept that 
cosmopolitan discourses are more prone to be linked to ‘cooler’ emotions and, as 
such, accept the prevalence of challenging discourses than ‘hotter’ emotions would 
do. Nonetheless, the evidence also indicates that symbols (especially London as a 
global city) and bodies (the revision of the Olympic Other) appeared constructive 
towards promoting the cosmopolitan discourse of London 2012. Nonetheless, 
discussions of these issues showed a low rate of interaction. While Katz and Liebz 
(2007) suggested that contemporary society is too accustomed to interruptions for 
media events to promote unity, the focus group evidence illustrates that collective 
effervescence – however disjointed and sporadic – might emerge periodically, 
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supporting the more recent observation that cosmopolitanism is likely to be 
‘conditional’ and ‘fragile’ (Skey, 2011, 2014).  
 
Conclusion  
This article set out to investigate how nationalist and cosmopolitan discourses 
operate through the transmission of emotions. Using original focus group evidence, it 
illustrated that nationalist discourses are more likely to accumulate in interactive 
settings and that emotions are more effectively transmitted through challenges to, 
rather than in support of, a discourse. For instance, enthusiasm for national unity and 
national community was evident in participants’ comments on the development of 
future “dreams” regarding “Team GB” and when they told stories of watching 
compatriots succeed in past Olympics. Further emotions related to nationalist 
discourses appeared to develop when participants criticised the exclusive character 
of the Games. In the case of 2012, this seems to have been most apparent in the 
“London centric” reporting of the mainstream media. In respect of Wodak et al.’s 
(2009) criteria for the construction of national identity, enduring support for intra-
national British uniformity was quite evident across all groups, followed by a number 
of references to a shared past, present and future. In comparison, the development 
of nationalist discourse through the transmission of outward-looking emotional 
references to a foreign ‘Other’ was less apparent.  
 
The evidence indicates that cosmopolitan discourses operated through the 
transmission of emotions somewhat differently. Suggestions that the Games and 
London 2012 were cosmopolitan were usually met with scepticism. The resulting 
discussions were more diffuse and led to less apparent (if any) transmission of 
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emotions. Nonetheless, when participants’ attention turned to bodies, rituals and 
symbols – through athletes, practice and Olympics insignia, their discussions had a 
more positive tone and sometimes even led to a sense of excitement for human 
achievement, going beyond their own national background. Thereby, paying more 
attention to these issues appeared to promote a form of cosmopolitan discourse 
within the groups. However, these discussions led to considerably less repetition and 
interaction than nationalist discourses had done so hitherto. Hence it seems Gerard 
Delanty’s (2009) criteria for a new ‘cosmopolitan imagination’ that comprises a 
positive recognition of the Other and the possibility of one normative global culture 
were met inconsistently and largely through short and negative criticisms. Even 
more, the stuttered expressions of cosmopolitanism did not seem to allow for the 
accumulation or circulation of enthusiasm.   
 
Therefore, the evidence illustrates how nationalist and cosmopolitan discourses 
operated through ‘hotter’ and ‘cooler’ emotions, respectively. Nationalist discourses 
were charged emotionally and were often sustained, providing a frame for a number 
of ideas, suggestions and criticisms. In contrast, we have concluded that 
cosmopolitan discourses were more diffuse and detached. What we are witnessing 
could be related to Ulrich Beck’s (2006) thesis on ‘methodological nationalism’.  
Methodological nationalism does not necessarily imply advocacy of nationalism, but 
it involves analysis that applies a rigid national frame and as such precludes 
cosmopolitan perspectives (Beck, 2006, p. 26). However, we did not observe 
positive recognition of the Other being dismissed or completely ignored – rather it 
was discussed, but with less emotional fluency, thereby providing an addendum to 
Beck and Delanty’s work.  
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Interestingly, the transmission of emotions in both nationalist and cosmopolitan 
discourses operated through participants’ challenges to practices, symbols or 
routines that are inherent features of the Games – whether in relation to how the 
media was likely to focus on a city (in this case London) instead of a host nation (in 
this case the UK) or how the somewhat forced emphasis on ‘positive vibes’ 
surrounding the Games hijacked more critical reflections about its exclusiveness, 
economic and social costs. This finding may shed a different light on why the 
transmission of emotions operated more through nationalist than cosmopolitan 
discourses. In particular, there is a strong indication that the transmission of 
emotions may operate better in those particular situations where people feel the 
requirement to express their opposition collectively. 
 
We recognise that our findings are not generalisable due to the small number of 
focus groups and the particular background of our participants, as well as the likely 
influence the group environment might have had on their answers (Bryman, 2012). 
Nonetheless, our inferences warrant further empirical investigation. For example, 
communication strategies recognise that certain target groups, notably “decision 
makers”, “opinion formers – including academics and the intelligentsia” and the 
“young”, are of particular significance in influencing broader publics (UK FCO, 2012; 
Pamment, 2013, p. 75). The participants were not representative of the general 
public but did meet these criteria – they included government employees, media 
practitioners and international academics from post-graduate to professorial level (all 
but one were in the 18-40 age bracket). As such, their discursive constructions could 
be expected to influence the perceptions of the general public. Future studies could 
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then scrutinise the extent to which the discursive constructions, which were apparent 
among our ‘decision-makers’ actually influence the perceptions of the general public. 
This issue is especially important when we consider the other main finding of this 
article – the way in which the transmission of emotions operates through challenges 
to, rather than in support of, existing discourses. Whether this finding is the result of 
our participants’ background or is applicable more broadly to the public requires 
further empirical examination.  
 
The focus group evidence also highlights the benefits of further marrying the rich 
theoretical literature surrounding affect with empirical research of the sort presented 
in this article. Our finding that emotions related to cosmopolitanism were diffuse and 
sporadic could be informative for academic analyses elsewhere. We are interested in 
whether such dispositions are evident not only at the Olympics but at other sports 
mega events, or even other global events related to politics, diplomacy and 
international relations. For instance, it is worth exploring whether a critical and 
challenging mode could be employed to generate greater transmission of emotions 
related to cosmopolitan discourses. According to the evidence, these modes implied 
to participants that the Olympics promoted cosmopolitan discourses. Whether this 
holds true in other situations could also be investigated. The transmission of 
emotions is prone to be different when cosmopolitan values are explicitly challenged 
– for example, through sustained discrimination such as racism, sexism or 
homophobia. This is just one potential area for future research and we encourage 
other researchers to analyse empirical situations to work through the ambiguity of 
social imagination and their corresponding emotions. 
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i This inside-out approach stands in contrast to the growing body of thought that 
draws attention to the various ways in which emotions are shaped by communicative 
practices. See, for example, the essays in Jacobs and Micciche (2003). In a reversal 
of Wetherell’s (2014, p. 138) statement that “[s]ome of the most productive routes for 
analysing affect lie in applying lessons learnt from discourse studies”, we suggest 
that some of the most productive routes for analysing (nationalist and cosmopolitan) 
discourses lie in applying concepts from emotion theory.  
ii Accordingly, we are neither interested in the discrete analysis of staged events, 
such as the torch relay and the opening ceremony, nor in a detached study of 
prefabricated texts, such as those produced by the British government and the 
international media. In both cases dialogue was lacking because of the one-
directional way in which nationalist and cosmopolitan messages were imposed on 
the audience (Pope, 2014).  
iii On this point, see also Ismer (2014, p. 138). 
iv This hot/cool dichotomy is different from Billig’s (1995) distinction between the ‘hot 
nationalism’ that flashes up in times of social disruption and the ‘banal nationalism’ of 
ordinary life. In fact, the Olympic Games can be seen as an example of both ‘banal 
nationalism’ (Billig, 1995) and ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ (Beck, 2002) whereby the 
word ‘banal’ refers to the routine nature of the event and is not a devaluing of any felt 
emotional intensity (Wetherell, 2014, pp. 139-140). 
v See also Ismer (2011, p. 553), who has shown how the 2006 World Cup allowed 
for a new representation of Germany through reference to various emotional rituals 
related to the tournament, and von Scheve et al. (2014), who tested whether 
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emotional entrainment during the 2010 World Cup had an effect on the emotional 
significance of German national symbols after the tournament. In addition, Sullivan 
(2013, 2014a, 2014b) has demonstrated how sports mega-events can lead to 
manifestations of ‘collective pride’ or ‘collective shame’. 
vi Participants were informed about our intention to write the findings of the focus 
group research up into a manuscript and provided oral consent for us to use their 
contribution – as long as our report of the evidence was anonymised.  
vii The discussions had a tendency to start off slowly and answers to the moderators’ 
questions were often given in the same order in which participants were seated. 
Even the content of the discussions had a descriptive and complementary character 
at the early stages. It was thus necessary for moderators to ask follow-up questions 
and be more interactive with the groups. As participants established rapport with one 
another and began to probe each other’s comments, the debates had an 
increasingly dynamic tone, requiring less involvement from the moderators. It was 
also at this point, where the content of debates shifted to more critical and insightful 
proposals, including, for example, doubts about the extent to which the London 
Olympics had a nation-wide mark. The focus groups were audio recorded and each 
moderator transcribed the recording of his or her group. Subsequently, the 
moderators developed initial profiles for their groups, citing key dynamics, discourses 
and, most importantly, transmission of emotions. In the final stages of the data 
analysis, the moderators worked together to reduce and thematically analyse the 
transcripts, comparing group profiles and identifying broader group dynamics.  
viii The number after participants denotes different speakers, e.g. British Male (1). It 
was necessary to include such numbers, as some groups included participants with 
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the same national and gender background. Unless stated otherwise, continuous 
passages from participants come from the same group and depict the dynamic and 
flow of the discussions (e.g. on page 16). 
ix In order to explore participants’ perceptions of ‘ritual symbols’ (Durkheim, 1912 
[1955]; Hargreaves, 2000, pp. 15 and 56) post cards and pictures of London 2012 
mascots were given to them as prompts at this point. 
 37 
Bibliography 
Ahmed, S. (2004) The Cultural Politics of Emotion. New York: Routledge. 
 
Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities; Reflections on the Origins and Spread 
of Nationalism. London: Verso. 
 
Barbalet, J. (2002) Emotions and Sociology. Blackwell: New York. 
 
Beck, U. (2002) ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies’, Theory, Culture and 
Society, 19, pp. 17-44. 
 
Beck, U. (2006) Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bleiker, R. and Hutchison, E. (2008) ‘Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics’, 
Review of International Studies, 34 (1), pp. 115-135. 
 
Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism. Sage: London. 
 
Brown, G. and Held, D. (2010) ‘Editors’ Introduction’, in The Cosmopolitan Reader. 
London: Polity Press, pp. 1-15. 
 
Bryman, A. (2012) Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 38 
 
Bulley, D. and Lisle, D. (2012) ‘Welcoming the World: Governing Hospitality in 
London’s 2012 Olympic Bid’, International Political Sociology, 6 (2), pp. 186-204. 
 
Cabrera, L. (2010) The Practice of Global Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Calhoun, C. (2002) ‘The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travellers: Towards a 
Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism’, South Atlantic Quarterly, 101 (4), pp. 
869-897.   
 
Closs Stephens, A. (2014) ‘Reading Angharad Closs Stephens’s The Persistence of 
Nationalism. From Imagined Communities to Urban Encounters’, Political 
Geography, 40 (1), pp. 56-63.  
 
Cui, X. (2013) ‘Media events are still alive: The Opening Ceremony of the Beijing 
Olympics as a Media Ritual’, International Journal of Communication (7) pp. 1220–
1235. 
 
Dayan, D. and Katz, E. (1992) Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 39 
Delanty, G. (2009) The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social 
Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Du, S. (2014) ‘Social Media and the Transformation of ‘Chinese Nationalism’: 
‘Igniting Positive Energy’ in China Since the 2012 London Olympics’, Anthropology 
Today, 30 (1), pp. 5-8. 
 
Durkheim, E. (1912 [1995]) The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Free 
Press. 
 
Fine, R. (2007) Cosmopolitanism.  London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Gellner, E. (1971) Thought and Change. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 
 
Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. London: Blackwell.  
 
Girginov, V. (2013) ‘Social, Political, Economic and Operational Context of the 2012 
London Olympic and Paralympic Games: An Introduction’ in Girginov, V. (ed.) 
Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games: Volume One: 
Making the Games. London: Routledge, pp. 1-13. 
 
Giulianotti, R. and Brownell, S. (2012) ‘Olympic and World Sport: Making 
Transnational Society?’, The British Journal of Sociology, 63 (2), pp. 199-215. 
 40 
 
Graham, S. (2012) ‘Olympics 2012 Security: Welcome to Lockdown London’, The 
Guardian, 12 March, G2. 
 
Hall, S. (2014) ‘Emotion, location and urban regeneration: The resonance of 
marginalised cosmopolitanism’ in Jones, H. and Jackson, E. (eds.) Stories of 
Cosmopolitan Belonging: Emotion and Location. London: Routledge, pp. 31-44. 
 
Hannerz, U. (1996) Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Hargreaves, J. (1992) ‘Olympism and Nationalism: Some Preliminary Consideration’ 
International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 27 (2), pp. 119-134. 
 
Hargreaves, J. (2000) Freedom for Catalonia; Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity 
and the Barcelona Olympic Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Held, D. (2003) Cosmopolitanism: A Defence. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Hobsbawm, E. (1990) Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, 
Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 41 
IOC (2011) Olympic Charter, The International Olympic Committee [online]. 
Available from: http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf 
[accessed 15 April 2015]. 
 
IOC (2013) ‘First IOC Executive Board Meeting Under President Bach’, IOC Press 
Release, The International Olympic Committee [online]. Available from: 
http://www.olympic.org/first-ioc-executive-board-meeting-under-president-bach 
[accessed 15 April 2015]. 
 
Ismer, S. (2011) ‘Embodying the Nation: Football, Emotions and the Construction of 
Collective Identity’, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 
39 (4), pp. 547-565. 
 
Ismer, S. (2014) ‘The Imagined National Community’ in Sullivan, G. B. (ed.) 
Understanding Collective Pride and Group Identity: New Directions in Emotion 
Theory, Research and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 137-148. 
 
Jacobs, D. and Micciche, L. (2003) A Way to Move: Rhetorics of Emotion and 
Composition Studies. Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann. 
 
Katz, E. and Liebes, T. (2007) ‘“No More Peace!”: How Disaster, Terror and War 
Have Upstaged Media Events.’ International Journal of Communication, 1 (2), pp. 
157-166. 
 42 
 
Jones, H., Jackson, E. and Rhys-Taylor, A. (2014) ‘Introduction: Moving and Being 
Moved’ in Jones, H. and Jackson, E. (eds.) Stories of Cosmopolitan Belonging: 
Emotion and Location. London: Routledge, pp. 1-14. 
 
Jowell, T. (2006) Keynote Speech at the 'Capturing the Public Value of Heritage' 
Event at the Royal Geographical Society, London, January 25.  
 
McCrone, D. and McPherson, G. (eds) (2009) National Days: Constructing and 
Mobilizing National Identity. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Mihelj, S. (2011) Media Nations: Communicating Belonging and Exclusion in the 
Modern World. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Morgan, D. L. (1998) ‘Planning Focus Groups’, Focus Group Kit 2. London: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Nash, K. (2003) ‘Cosmopolitan Political Community: Why Does It Feel So Right?’ 
Constellations, 10 (4), pp. 506-518. 
 
Nussbaum, M. (1997) ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’ The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 5 (1), pp. 1-25. 
 43 
 
Nussbaum, M. (2001) Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pamment, J. (2013) New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study 
of Policy and Practice. London: Routledge. 
 
Pope, M. (2014) Public Diplomacy, International News Media and London 2012: 
CosmopolitanismTM Sport in Society, 17 (9), pp. 1119-1135. 
 
Salmela, M. (2012) ‘Shared Emotions’ Philosophical Explorations, 66, 33-46.  
 
Salmela, M. (2014) ‘The Rational Appropriateness of Collective Emotions’ in 
Sullivan, G. B. (ed.) Understanding Collective Pride and Group Identity: New 
Directions in Emotion Theory, Research and Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 21-33. 
 
Shilling, C. (2002) ‘The Two Traditions in the Sociology of Emotions’ in Barbalet, J. 
(ed.) Emotions and Sociology. Blackwell: New York, pp. 10-33.  
 
Skey, M. (2011) National Belonging and Everyday Life: The Significance of 
Nationhood in an Uncertain World, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 44 
Skey, M. (2014) ‘‘What Nationality He Is Doesn't Matter a Damn!’ International 
Football, Mediated Identities and Conditional Cosmopolitanism’ National Identities, 
pp. 1-17.  
 
Smith, A. (1987) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Smith, E. R., Seger, C. R. and Mackie, D. M. (2007) ‘Can Emotions be Truly Group 
Level? Evidence Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria’ Jounral of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 93, pp. 431-446. 
 
Sullivan, G. B. (2013) ‘Collective Pride, Happiness and Celebratory Emotions: 
Aggressive, Network and Cultural Models’ in von Scheve, C. and Salmela, M. (eds.) 
Collective Emotions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sullivan, G. B. (2014a) ‘Introduction’ in Sullivan, G. B. (ed.) Understanding Collective 
Pride and Group Identity: New Directions in Emotion Theory, Research and Practice. 
London: Routledge, pp. 1-18. 
 
Sullivan, G. B. (2014b) ‘Collective Emotions and the World Cup 2014: The 
Relevance of Theories and Research on Collective Pride and Shame’ Psicologia e 
Saber Social, 3(1), pp. 112-117. 
 
Tamir, Y. (1993) Liberal Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 45 
 
Tomlinson, J. (1999) Globalisation and Culture. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
UK FCO (2012) ‘Foreign and Commonwealth Website: About Us’, Public Diplomacy, 
UK FCO [online]. Available from: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120805125210/http://www.fco.gov.uk/en
/about-us/what-we-do/public-diplomacy/london-2012/ [accessed 15 April 2015]. 
 
von Scheve, C. (2012) ‘Collective Emotions in Rituals: Elicitation, Transmission, and 
a “Matthew-Effect”’ in Michaels, A. and Wulf, C. (eds.) Emotions in Rituals and 
Performance. London: Routledge, pp. 55-77. 
 
von Scheve, C., Beyer, M., Ismer, S., Kozlowska, M. and Morawetz, C. (2014) 
‘Emotional Entrainment, National Symbols, and Identification: A Naturalistic Study 
Around the Men’s Football World Cup’ Current Sociology, 62 (1), pp. 3-23. 
 
Wetherell, M. (2012) Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding. 
London: Sage. 
 
Wetherell, M. (2014) ‘Affect and Banal Nationalism: A Practical Dialogic Approach to 
Emotion’ in Antaki, C. and Condor, S. (eds.) Rhetoric, Ideology and Social 
Psychology. Essays in Honour of Michael Billig. London: Routledge. 
 
 46 
Wodak, R., DeCilla, R., Reisigl, M., and Liebhart, K. (2009) The Discursive 
Construction of National Identity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
 
 
